The term "lawfare" has been used to refer to the use of international criminal law as a tool of war. Despite the expansive employment of the term to refer to appeals to law in ongoing conflict, this article demonstrates how "lawfare" has taken on negative meaning without ethical justification. We argue that the co-opting of the term as a means of condemnation is unfair and potentially detrimental, and a more exacting definition and narrower use of the term are needed to avoid obfuscating potentially purposeful recourses to international criminal law. In looking at how international criminal lawfare has manifested with referrals to the ICC, it becomes clear that problems of negative perceptions lie not with lawfare itself, but with the intentional obstruction by parties interested in the outcome of a conflict. Tackling these negative perceptions also lays the groundwork for a necessary future argument for the international community's moral responsibility to promote safeguards to ensure that the international criminal legal system is itself just.
Introduction
International criminal law, and the International Criminal Court (ICC or "the Court") specifically, exists at the intersection of law and politics. In just over a decade, the ICC has developed from a simple yet powerful idea to an international institution that boasts 123 states parties and is used by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a tool in its arsenal for the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion and protection of human rights globally. As an instrument of legal order, international criminal law (ICL) is meant to demonstrate objectivity and impartiality in its conclusions regarding justice and the commission of particular crimes. As an international institution, however, there is the potential for agents to attempt to use it for political and strategic gains. In more than one conflict globally, ICL has been used to garner advantage in 2 political and peace negotiations, to legitimize acts by explaining or justifying them in the language of ICL, or to invite outside parties to judge behaviours of war and perhaps even settle disputes.
This intersection of law and politics in the international sphere introduces interesting moral questions about how criminal law ought to be used in the context of ongoing conflicts.
This article questions specifically the ethics of appeals to international criminal law with the intention of influencing the outcome of a conflict. The first section of the article acknowledges the tradition of using the term "lawfare" to refer to the use of law in conflict, but in doing so, must contend with the lack of consistent understanding or use of the term. With an etymology of "lawfare" and a discussion of the current intellectual debates regarding what acts should be included under "lawfare", as well as whether the label necessarily signals an abuse of law, the first section explores this lack of consensus on the definition. This indeterminate definition results in a lack of consensus with regard to the acts included within the category, and also, to whether the acts are inherently immoral or not. We explain our preference for a narrow definition of lawfare in the international criminal context, to speak to the appeal to ICL by parties who wish to influence the outcome of ongoing conflict. Once a definition of the term is settled, acknowledging the value of a label attached to specific appeals to ICL, we turn to the question of the morality of the use of international criminal lawfare. We argue that international criminal lawfare is, in fact, not inherently immoral and provide ethical reasoning for the need to rescue the term "lawfare" from its largely negative connotations. Its current use obfuscates the possible purposeful use of criminal law in conflict and may act to deter those who would use it justly. 3 We argue that misunderstanding the connection between the use of lawfare and problems with the system as cause-and-effect can invite some unwelcome results, including the dissuasion of parties to conflict from appealing to ICL when appropriate, out of fear of being negatively perceived for doing so. We believe this rescuing exercise is important, given the potential of the term to meet a need in our vocabulary: a word that describes a particular appeal to law and which alerts us to the need to be watchful for potential misuse and attempts at interference. There is reason to be cautious of such appeals. However, such appeals should not be excluded from the international legal system, nor should they all be regarded as immoral and inappropriate. Finally, we argue that there is a corresponding moral responsibility borne by the international community to ensure that the ICL system is itself just, and to be resistant to attempts at manipulation and subverting the law. Lawfare in the international criminal legal system, under the right conditions, can be just and appropriate, and should be supported by members of the international community as a means of protecting and promoting human rights globally.
2.
An Etymology of "Lawfare" and the Rhetorical Use of the Term in International

Politics
The term "lawfare" originates from the work of John Carlson and Neville Yeomans who referred to it in their argument regarding the movement away from the "humanitarian" community systems of justice (restorative) to more "utilitarian" systems (retributive), which are monopolized by the 4 state. 1 Carlson and Yeomans lament that the search for truth and harmony of the restorative approaches are replaced by the adversarial and accusatory procedures of the courts and that "lawfare replaces warfare, and the duel is with words rather than swords". 2 What is interesting about this first use of the term "lawfare" is that it points to the power and the limitations of the use of a system of retributive justice. As the authors note, retributive processes are coercive, combative, and their effectiveness depends on the policies and actions of the power wielders.
Twenty-four years later, the term was again used to convey the power of using law to win a victory over one's adversary. In 1999, two officers of China's People's Liberation Army, Qiao
Liang and Wang Xiangsui, published a book entitled Unrestricted Warfare. In this work, the term "lawfare" was used, not to refer to retributive or criminal justice at all, but rather in terms of 'seizing the earliest opportunity to set up regulations'
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, in a place where 'politics...has become the continuation -or even just one of the manifestations -of war'. 4 In this sense, the monopoly of law is viewed as just one of the different modalities with which one may be able to wage war.
Since the introduction of "lawfare" in these works, the term has been picked up and used quite liberally to refer to a wide array of acts that combine the use or appeal to law within an adversarial context. 
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Charles J. Dunlap brought the term "lawfare" to the forefront of contemporary discussions when, in 2001, he defined it as 'the use of law as a weapon in war'.
5 Dunlap changed his approach to lawfare over the years, partly in response to comments on his widely-circulated 2001 article, to focus on the transformative aspects of law and war, and 'deliver law to strategic instrumentalization by all parties for their own advantage'.
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The refined definition focuses on 'the strategy of using -or misusing -law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective'. Lawfare, understood in this ideologically neutral way, is 'much the same as a weapon' 10 in that it can be used for good or bad purposes.
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Others, however, emphasize only the negative connotation of the term "lawfare", by suggesting that it is a 'strategy of the weak, using international fora, judicial processes and terrorism'. 12 Unfortunately, the negative connotation applied to the term has taken root, at least in some circles. Arguably, in its contemporary use, lawfare 'is used most commonly as a label to criticize those who use international law and legal proceedings to make claims against the state, especially in areas related to national security'. Should all of these examples be rightly included under the definition of "lawfare"? Arguably, no.
Too broad a definition risks rendering the term relatively meaningless.
It becomes evident that lawfare exists at the intersection of law and war but lacks the precisely articulated, and consistently used, definition necessary for a discussion of the ethical implications of its use. In fact, in 2010 a group of legal scholars convened to question precisely what lawfare really is. 25 While some legal experts argued the term could be useful if more narrowly defined, there was little consensus as to how best to define it, despite the fact that most 'participants agreed...that the reactive, "right-wing" concept of "lawfare" constituted a "hijacking" of the term and should be rejected'. 26 We suggest that a narrower definition is in fact needed to clarify what lawfare encompasses and the conditions under which it can and should be used. The term "lawfare"
should be limited to the use of judicial interventions as a tool for states, parties to conflict, and other interested actors to pursue political ends. 27 This definition makes three important points about 23 Scharf and Andersen, supra note 13, p. 17. 9 the concept of lawfare: first, the scope of the definition is such that acts can be evaluated against the definition for fit, thereby eliminating a broad and meaningless use of the term; second, it cannot be employed simply as shorthand for criticism, since it refers to characterisable acts; and, third, under this definition, lawfare can include uses of law and legal processes that complement as well as substitute for traditional military means, and include both positive and negative motivations for appealing to law.
If lawfare is defined as the above-mentioned tool of using judicial interventions, then international criminal lawfare is the use of international criminal judicial interventions as a tool for states, parties to conflict, and other interested actors, including the UNSC, to pursue political ends. We regard the characterisation currently assigned to lawfare in popular discourse as both too broad and too limiting, in that it depicts lawfare as encompassing a variety of disparate acts and also as largely the manipulation or misuse of law to achieve operational objectives. 28 The positive implications to a more precise definition include, first, the hope that it would in fact encourage relevant parties to a conflict to pursue their conflict in a judicial theatre as opposed to a theatre of armed conflict. A definition that 'includes the proper use of law as a substitute for military means encourages using law instead of military force'
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and supports 'a race to the courtroom instead of to the battlefield.' 30 As Dunlap notes, recourse to the courts is a facet of lawfare to be encouraged.
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Second, a more precise definition, coupled with a more consistent use of the concept would focus Interpretations of lawfare as recourses to law, absent any moral judgement based simply on the appeal to law, are most appropriate. Louise Arbour's words acknowledging the complex range of manifestations of lawfare best reflect our own conviction triggering the ethical defence of international criminal lawfare:
Lawfare is, in and of itself, neither good nor bad…Spurious or outright false claims threaten to bring the entire concept of humanitarian law into disrepute, and can create the erroneous perception that it is the law itself -and not its deliberate misapplication -which is at fault. But crying "lawfare!" … creates the appearance that the accused cannot justify their actions…
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While misuses and manipulations of ICL exist and there is need for systemic changes for ICL to be more resistant to these, we should not disregard the potential of ICL to create positive outcomes. In the next section, we look at some recent accusations of lawfare, which affect the ICC in its unique position as an international criminal court that can investigate and adjudicate cases from ongoing conflict. And while these lawfare cases have had negative effects on the Court's legitimacy, we show that it is not true that lawfare itself is to blame. We explore the conditions that lead to faults in how lawfare has been perceived recently and pinpoint ethical considerations which could salvage the concept from an exclusive focus on unjust manipulation. These conditions are then incorporated into a discussion of the international community's moral responsibility to support just reforms of the system.
International Criminal Lawfare and the Conditions that Lead to Perception Faults
Since its entry into force in 2002, the ICC has made strides in its pursuit for accountability for international crimes. In its formative years, a few remarkable and unpredicted characteristics emerged; these have both strengthened and decreased the Court's claims to legitimacy. A significant one is a proclivity for states to refer situations occurring within their own borders. It was not envisioned that any state would self-refer, and yet the first three situations before the Court We contend with the idea that the fault lies with lawfare per se. Rather, the use of lawfare makes problems of the system or court transparent. Highlighted by tricky cases of lawfare, it might seem that these problems either originate with the pursuit of lawfare or they can be eliminated if lawfare 12 is deemed immoral and prevented. Misunderstanding the connection between the use of lawfare and problems with the system as cause-and-effect, however, can invite some unwelcome results, including the dissuasion of parties to conflict from appealing to ICL when appropriate out of fear of being negatively perceived for doing so.
It is true that the bias and selectivity reflected in the operations of the ICC affect both the real and perceived legitimacy of ICL. 33 However, what is not evident is that it is the use of international criminal lawfare that has created this bias and selectivity. Examples of contemporaneous situations before the Court, such as Uganda, Darfur, Libya, and Palestine, demonstrate different aspects of the combination of lawfare and abuse of law that cannot and
should not be conflated with lawfare itself. It is this combination, we argue, that gives international criminal lawfare its negative connotation and distasteful characterisation. There is a difference between appealing to law with self-interested motivations and intentionally perverting, hindering, or obstructing law.
Lawfare by State Referrals
Despite a number of states having self-referred situations to date, not one has helped with legitimising the ICC, and in fact each has in some manner negatively impacted the legitimacy of the ICC. The biggest problem is that the ICC depends on the self-referring governments for 33 Kirsten J Fisher, Moral Accountability and International Criminal Law (New York: Routledge, 2012).
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cooperation to gain access to witnesses and evidence and to assist with investigations and
prosecutions. This contributes to the ICC's legitimacy deficit, which is enhanced by states' lack of compliance with the Court's requests for evidence and cooperation.
The Ugandan example demonstrates how a referring party both invited the ICC to investigate alleged crimes committed in an ongoing conflict, therefore employing lawfare, and expected and received preferential treatment and a one-sided investigation of abuses committed. mention of (only) the LRA in the initial press releases, and indictments of only LRA members for atrocities committed in northern Uganda as evidence of lack of objectivity in the Court's response, perhaps for prudential reasons.
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The motivations of the Ugandan government are clear: the self-referral was aimed at discrediting the government's opponent in the conflict, 'to delegitimize and remove… troublesome insurgents that could not be defeated militarily'.
38 Separate from the government's motivation in referring the situation to the ICC, however, is the Court's response to the referral. When the ICC must, or feels that it must, rely on the goodwill of the government of the territory, it will be constrained by politics as much as law, and is hampered in its performing its duties. When the referring party is both a party to the conflict and the sovereign over the territory, there is fertile ground for real and perceived inappropriate interference. Here, then, we have the potential for a dangerous combination of use of lawfare (neutral) and interference (morally wrong).
Palestine provides a more recent example of self-referral, which despite being unique, also highlights the limitations of the current system for objectively adjudicating crimes committed in war. Palestine's self-referral is perhaps a good example of the use of lawfare to invite a supposedly just and objective arbiter to weigh in on a conflict and tactics taken in war. And although the referral invites (at least in theory) investigation into the actions of both sides to the conflict, it was met by political obstacles that hindered the Court operating as it might. Arguably, the attempts 
Lawfare through the UN Security Council's Judicial Interventions
The Libyan example demonstrates how the UNSC, as representative of the international community, can engage in lawfare by referring a situation to the Court, and at the same time both avoid referring another like situation because of the self-interest of members of the UNSC, and also shielding particular actors from investigation. UNSC resolution 1970, which was adopted Unsurprisingly, there were expectations that the referral of Libya to the ICC ought to be followed by other like situations, including Syria. 54 A number of parallels between these two situations include the brutality by which the regime attempted -or still attempts -to suppress the will of the populace, the widespread violence and destruction civilians experienced, and the fragmentation of the opposition which creates a situation where a unified government -and, with it, domestic judicial systems able to dispense objective modes of justice -is difficult to establish.
Syria, like Libya, is not a member state of the ICC and therefore, UNSC referral is the only way to bring the situation before the Court. Of course, there is reason to question the benefit of such a referral, as the referral of Libya arguably 'did not help resolve the crisis, but instead added fuel to the flames of conflict.'
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Nevertheless, this situation highlights the problem of the current make-up of UNSC power, especially the special veto power held by the permanent five (P5) members. The lack of UNSC attention to Syria is arguably not reflective of a lack of international will but rather the power of individual P5 members that possess veto power and can protect their allies from investigation by 54 E.g., Birdsall, supra note 50. 
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The pursuit of lawfare per se, in the form of various agents' appeals to international criminal law as opposed to recourse to force, must not necessarily affect the legitimacy of the ICC or other courts negatively. As Richard Falk argues, we should not 'denigrate reliance on the procedures and norms of international law in seeking to pursue rights or hold individuals accountable for violations of international criminal law'. 58 There is potential for good in the adjudication of ICL in the midst of ongoing conflict, restricted to a disinterested judge in the form of an international institution. This, however, puts significant stress on the international institution to exude fairness and the perception of fairness. Bias and selectivity reflected in the operations of the ICC affect both the real and perceived legitimacy of ICL.
Situations in which parties to a conflict attempt to garner advantage over their opponents through a referral to the ICC or other international judicial body, irrespective of self-serving and unjust motivations and expectations of the referring parties, is a condition to which international law and politics should aspire: lawfare over warfare. When used in this way, ICL can add an additional, non-lethal dimension to a conflict, and also shift the discussion and debate to a third party, and away from the belligerents. This aspiration for ICL, however, puts significant moral responsibility on the international community, both to support the objective application of international criminal law in all situations investigated by the Court and also to ensure that referrals by the international community's representative (the UNSC) is just and even-handed. One of the justifications for ICL is that international applications of law can be more objective in situations where it would be difficult for local administers of law to be. 59 International institutions can help to avoid critical problems such as those introduced by the vagueness of law, the natural inclination toward vengeance, and seeing only one's own motivations or complaints as just. 67 The objectivity provided by an international institution should also be able to tame the self-aggrandizing nature of appeals to law which posit one's own side as morally superior. In this way, institutionalizing retributive justice in an international institution like the ICC is possibly the best chance of averting abuse of power cloaked in the vocabulary of law.
Furthermore, these international institutions introduce a third party to the conflict which shifts the focus -even if ever so slightly -from interactions between the opposing agents to a third, internationally recognised and legitimate entity with legal and political clout. In essence, the involvement of international institutions with objective legal and procedural elements may in fact shift the focus of the conflict which may provide a new legal and political space in which the participants can manoeuvre. This sort of widening of the realm of the conflict may reveal a more nuanced prism through which the very conflict may be judged, or even decided. The problems appear when the use of lawfare is confused with intentional obfuscations of justice. The examples in this article demonstrate how the enterprise of ICL is hampered by the reality of current conditions that affect the ability of the Court to pursue justice unfettered, and be seen to do so.
They also show the need for more support from the international community for the Court to pursue justice unfettered where the commission of atrocity crimes is suspected. The use of lawfare makes problems of the system transparent. There is, thus, a moral responsibility to clarify that these problems per se need to be addressed, and that the solution is not to deem lawfare as always immoral. For example, the relationship between the ICC and the UNSC, as it stands, negatively affects the Court's work and reputation by generating a condition in which its caseload is shaped by the concerns and self-interests of permanent members of the UNSC. Since a referral by the UNSC is the method by which the 'international community' can initiate ICL proceedings, reforms to this body to ensure its objectivity are a moral concern to all members of the UN. 69 All states, as actors who contribute to the structural injustice, have this responsibility to work towards change.
The "responsibility not to veto" proposal is particularly salient since there are those who already raised questions about the appropriateness of the UNSC as a referring body, when three of its permanent members (US, China, Russia) are not state parties, and as such, not under the ICC's jurisdiction themselves. 70 There is broad support for the two main veto restrain proposals -the French Proposal, and the Accountability, Coherence, Transparency (ACT) Group's "Code of
Conduct" -as seen in the most recent debates on the topic in the UN General Assembly, in
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September 2015. 71 The moral argument that mass atrocity crimes are so egregious that different rules should apply captures the essence of such ethical appeals.
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To be morally sufficient, an institution or doctrine must, minimally, not interfere with the satisfaction of basic human rights. In the case of an enterprise that imposes international order, it must be shaped so that all persons subjected to it are, if not equally able to benefit from it, not harmed by its arrangement. 73 When an institutional order that coercively limits actions alternative to its own and itself avoidably fails to protect human rights, the order and the participants of it are violating a duty of justice. 74 Therefore, all member states of the ICC, but more broadly all states globally as participants in an international order that creates the rules of ICL, have the moral responsibility to ensure that the system in which they participate and which has so much power is a just one. In regards to international criminal lawfare, justice demands that parties to a conflict have equal access to an international institution (ICC) to make pronouncements about the legality of tactics taken and that parties to the conflict are treated equitably under the law. 
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Conclusion
The use of lawfare is inevitable, and not necessarily contemptible. While we do not want to praise every self-interested referral to the ICC or other appeal to ICL as the height of morality, there are real ways in which the use of lawfare can contribute to peacebuilding and the promotion of respect for law. As it stands, however, the term is now unwieldy, and the negative connotations can mask the potentially purposeful uses of law in ongoing conflict. This article has argued that the current state of the term's usage can at worst undermine the possible benefits of interested parties employing lawfare as an alternative or supplement to armed conflict for what we would consider goals with 'right' on their side, and at best muddy the water around discussions about the problems that contemporary ICL and its institution(s) face.
Not all applications of ICL are lawfare. In many cases, ICL is employed once a conflict has ended and the society is engaged in the difficult and necessary endeavour of rebuilding.
International criminal law often has a significant role to play in serving justice, restoring faith in the domestic judicial system, and the promotion of human rights protection in a society ravaged by conflict and mass violations. However, when ICL is introduced in ongoing conflicts, it can have a unique constitution, as a form of conflict management strategy or an instrument of further polarization and stacking power unevenly behind one party. International criminal lawfare, under the right conditions, can be just and appropriate and should be supported by members of the international community as a means of protecting and promoting human rights globally.
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The moral responsibility of the international community can, and should, be met in a number of ways, including ensuring that states in conflict regard the Court as just and fair. This means that the international community should work to support the Court's ability to investigate and pursue indictments of all atrocity crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, regardless of which party to the conflict refers the case or has more power to support access for investigative purposes. This implies ensuring that all states wanting to have access to refer situations could do so without risking political reprisal, and ensuring that referrals by the international community's representative (UNSC) are, first, done justly and fairly, reflecting the worst or most deserving situations globally in which international crimes occurred, and, second, ensuring that like situations are treated in like manners.
